By Willy Stern

The day after the ValuJet DC-9 crashed in the Florida Everglades in May 1996, the phone rang in my midtown Manhattan office.

“Who is Adam Bryant of the New York fucking Times?” rasped my caller, a veteran FBI agent in Miami. “This Bryant guy calls me thinking I’m gonna tell him something ’cause he’s with the fucking New York Times. What kinda arrogance is that? He didn’t give a fuck about me last week before the plane went down in the swamp.”

Try to look past the colorful language of the federal agent—a confidential source from my days as a Business Week staff writer—and listen carefully to his message. We in the media—and in politics, law enforcement, and pretty much everywhere else today—tend to pay attention to potential disasters only after they happen.

Even today, in the wake of the worst incident of terrorism on U.S. soil, most commentators and analysts are focusing on yesterday’s terrorism problems, rather than tomorrow’s.

“About the only thing you can be sure of going forward is that aviation travel will be safe,” reports Lehman Brothers’ Mark Melcher, a Washington, D.C.-based political analyst who has written widely in recent years on the very real dangers of terrorism.

“Congress will hold hearings on airport safety, and the terrorists will have a good laugh,” explains Melcher. “The terrorists have already moved on to other targets—which virtually nobody is thinking about today—while we’re holding a ridiculous national debate on curbside check-in.”

As a primer for digesting the news in the wake of last Tuesday’s suicide bombings, here are 12 random thoughts worth pondering:

♦ Airplanes and airports are safe.

The good news is that the problem in the skies is being fixed. The bad news is that much of the rest of the country is vulnerable.

According to several anti-terrorism experts, last Tuesday’s events took five-plus years to plan. Intelligence analysts assume that the next terrorist attacks are already three to four years into the planning stages. These future attacks are being developed under the assumption that U.S. security efforts will focus on protecting airports and airplanes; hence the next wave of terror will almost certainly hit elsewhere.

♦ The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has known for years that domestic airport security is a standing joke, yet it has done little to fix the problem.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Office of the Inspector General—the watchdog agency that keeps an eye on the FAA—has prepared detailed reports spelling out the airport security problems that have been all over the news of late. (For details, go to www.oig.dot.gov, then hit aviation (FAA) security.) Read the reports and weep.

Start with the Nov. 18, 1999, study, which had this to say: “During our testing, we successfully penetrated secure areas by: piggybacking [following] employees through doors; riding unguarded elevators; walking through concourse doors, gates, and jetbridges; walking through cargo facilities unchallenged; and driving through unmanned vehicle gates. After penetrating secure areas, we boarded a substantial number of aircraft operated by U.S. and foreign air carriers. In some instances, we were seated and ready for departure at the time we concluded our tests.”

♦ The greatest terrorist threats today are biological agents.

Biological agents are easily accessible, almost impossible to detect, and extremely deadly. Listen to the words of terrorism expert Peter Probst, who told the Scene this week that “only a few grams of pulmonary anthrax, which has something on the order of a 95 percent lethality rate, could take out a major government complex. Similarly, a vial of such an agent dropped from the Senate gallery could take out much of this country’s leadership.”

Probst, an ex-CIA employee who has spent more than three decades developing counter-terrorism plans for the U.S. Department of Defense and others, says that “the terrorist weapon of the future could, at first glance, appear to be an ordinary light bulb, which, in turn, is a preferred covert delivery method for biological agents. Terrorists could take several such devices filled with pulmonary anthrax and toss them onto the tracks of the Washington Metro. The bulbs would shatter, and lethal spores would be carried throughout the system by the convection currents of passing trains. They would cling to the clothing and shoes of the subway commuters, who would track it into their homes and offices. Thousands would aspirate the deadly spores. Thousands would die.” Meanwhile, we prattle on about curbside check-in.

♦ The U.S. is extremely vulnerable in the event of germ warfare.

According to Dr. Ken Alibek, the first deputy chief of the secret Soviet germ warfare program from 1988 to 1992, nations like Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, and Yemen have lured away and hired Soviet scientists who are knowledgeable in biological weapons. Alibek, who defected to the U.S. in 1992 and has briefed U.S. intelligence and medical officials about the threat of biological weapons, says it’s “highly probable” that terrorists already have obtained Soviet chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. And the things they have procured are awful in their magnitude. According to a 1999 interview Alibek gave to EmergencyNet NewsService, the Soviet Union has developed strains of anthrax, plague, and other infectious and deadly diseases—including tularemia and glanders—that can’t be treated with antibiotics.

♦ Toxins can be easily manufactured.

In the mid-1990s, a defense contractor got nervous about the ease with which terrorists could obtain deadly toxins. The contractor set up a test by posting, in an online chatroom, the formula for making sarin, a deadly biological agent. “The formula was genuine, except for some subtle omissions which would render the result harmless,” Probst explains.

Less than an hour later, Probst reports, “some 30 different messages were posted giving the correct formulation and pointing out the errors in the consultant’s work.” (Probst has been huddled all week with top government offiicials—he won’t name the agency—to help plot the next U.S. move.)

♦ Numerous experts were predicting an event similar to the suicide attacks. But you won’t hear that from the Pentagon.

In testimony before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in 1996, another terrorism expert, Steve Emerson, predicted last Tuesday’s events with deadly accuracy. “The United States will, in my opinion, increasingly serve as a lightning rod for international terrorists who perceive the U.S. as an enemy that must be destroyed because of its inherent evil nature,” Emerson testified.

He also told the senators that “terrorists will attempt to carry out attacks that will generate mass casualties and fatalities.” He predicted that the terrorists “will most likely target office buildings or arenas housing large civilian populations.” Owing in large measure to his views, Emerson has been branded a racist and an alarmist who relies on questionable sources and shoddy research techniques.

Before the Sept. 11 attacks, he was so hard up for cash that he was cold-calling would-be donors in an effort to keep open his anti-terrorism outfit, Investigative Project on Religious Extremism. But now, because of the attacks, Emerson is so much in demand that he’s lucky to get two hours’ sleep a night.

In June 1994, terrorism expert Probst co-authored an extraordinary Pentagon report, “Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism,” which outlined and predicted with alarming accuracy a terrorist attack on the American financial markets and the World Trade Center, according to those who’ve obtained copies. Unfortunately, you can’t read the report. The Pentagon never released it to the public. The Los Angeles Times reported in 1998 that “even a sanitized version designed to promote public preparedness was axed.” Why didn’t the Defense Department release it? The report was considered “too alarmist and farfetched” for average Americans to read, according to The Los Angeles Times. One wonders if the families of the dead Pentagon employees would see the report as farfetched today.

Interestingly, Probst tells the Scene that he’s now “terribly worried” about agricultural terrorism using biological agents. “The U.S. beef industry is worth billions,” he says. “It could grind to a halt overnight if something like foot-and-mouth disease were introduced. They keep cattle in feed lots with 300,000 head of cattle. If only one cow was affected, they’d have to shoot them all. They’d have to call in the Kansas National Guard to machine-gun them. This is stealth terrorism; it’s impossible to prove that it wasn’t an act of God.”

♦ The editorial department of the Nashville Scene and the engineering department at Vanderbilt University together have the resources, manpower, and know-how to conduct a terrorist attack that would obliterate much of Nashville as we know it today.

Much of the materials could be purchased at a local hardware store. Here’s a partial list of what’s immediately vulnerable: the city’s electric grid, railroad and highway bridges, the water supply, public arenas, and other large buildings. Details on the methods of destruction follow:

♦ To cut off this city’s electricity, you simply take out a number of Middle Tennessee electric substations.

The substations are accessible and could be destroyed by a simple exploding device. In doing so, a terrorist could shut down electric service to Nashville, perhaps for a few days. Chaos might well ensue. “Among engineers, it’s been known for years that someone could do some real damage to the electric grid,” explains Francis Wells, associate professor of electrical engineering at Vanderbilt University. “It wouldn’t be easy, but it’s doable.”

♦ Any of the large railroad or highway bridges around Nashville—like those spanning the Cumberland River—could be taken down without too much trouble.

Ed Burdette, the Fred N. Peebles Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, says a “trained” terrorist who knew what he was doing could bring down any of the nation’s largest bridges, such as New York’s George Washington Bridge or San Francisco’s Golden Gate Bridge. And a terrorist could do that “without too much trouble.” How? By planting bombs at the base of the structural supports that hold up the bridges.

In Nashville, meanwhile, it would take even less knowledge and proficiency to get the job done. With a few well-placed bombs planted by a terrorist cruising along in a rented bass boat, the terrorist could destroy any of the bridges spanning the Cumberland. Burdette says it would be “hard” to bring down a large structure like the Gaylord Entertainment Center, Neyland Stadium, or Adelphia Coliseum, but he warns they are “vulnerable” to attacks that could cause many deaths.

“I don’t want to scare people, but you have to be realistic,” says Bart Jennings, senior research associate with the University of Tennessee Center for Transportation. “It would be easy [for terrorists] to bring down the major east-west railroad and highway bridges over the Mississippi or Hudson. All it would take is some training, materials, and a willingness to do it. There are a few major choke points for east-west transportation across the country that are obvious to those in the industry. Same is true for the gas pipelines, water pipelines, even the phone lines and fiber-optic cables. Backhoes dig in and tear up major pipelines by accident all the time; can you imagine what a trained terrorist could do?”

♦ Metro Nashville’s primary water supply, the 51-millon-gallon Eighth Avenue Reservoir, is less vulnerable to contamination by chemical or biological weapons than is widely believed.

Sure, a terrorist could obtain a deadly virus, cut a hole in the protective fabric cover, and toss the virus into the reservoir. A reporter was able to access the reservoir grounds, drive around the structure, and even stand at the base of the reservoir Monday morning. But the water system’s own cleansing apparatus eventually would eradicate much of the deadly virus. “A terrorist could do some damage, particularly to those who first received the contaminated water flow,” says Edward Thackston, a specialist in water quality management at Vanderbilt. “But a lot more damage could be done using airborne agents since we don’t clean the air before we breathe it.” As well, local gas pipelines around the country are vulnerable to attack, terrorism experts warn.

♦ If you’re in the market for germs, just place an order.

White supremacist Larry Wayne Harris recently had some official-looking letterhead made, and then ordered three vials of bubonic plague from a Rockville, Md., laboratory. The vials were delivered by Federal Express. Law enforcement officials quickly caught him, but since it’s not illegal to possess bubonic plague, he was convicted only of mail fraud. His sentence? Eighteen months’ probation.

If you don’t want to order the stuff already made, you can get various recipes from easily obtainable sources. When the white supremacist group known as the “Patriot’s Council” wanted to get the formula for recin, another deadly biological agent, it reportedly found what it needed in a Soldier of Fortune magazine advertisement. A Soldier of Fortune spokesman, however, does not recall the incident and says the magazine tries to screen such ads before publication.

♦ If you’re wondering why the threat of terrorism hasn’t taken a front seat in this country, consider these statistics.

Tuesday’s terrorists killed an estimated 5,000 people. Last year, drunk drivers killed 16,058 people on America’s roads, heart disease killed an estimated 800,000 Americans, more than 235,000 died last year of cancers of the digestive system, and breast cancer claimed 193,000. Nobody is talking about putting U.S. marshals outside liquor stores and cigarette vending machines.

As the nation mourns, there is a natural tendency to want to figure out precisely what happened. Unfortunately, this often leads to fighting yesterday’s war. Vanderbilt University political science professor Jim Ray, a specialist in international conflict, rightly points out that, as a nation, we’d be well served to focus on “less obvious” sources of potential trouble.

When I was at Business Week in the mid-1990s, I holed up for some weeks in a ramshackle, cockroach-infested hotel near the Miami airport, gathering tidbits for an investigative story on growing numbers of counterfeit aircraft parts showing up on major U.S.-based airlines. While reporting the story, my days were spent with government snitches, undercover cops, aircraft mechanics, airplane parts brokers, and FBI agents who included the uncouth G-man who wasn’t enamored of Adam Bryant (who is, by the way, a first-rate reporter now working at Newsweek).

These aviation safety professionals shared a common mission: They were petrified that the enormous—and lucrative—trade in bogus aircraft parts was going to cause an airline disaster. They were frustrated that few people of note, in the media or elsewhere, would listen to their concerns because the disaster hadn’t happened yet. They knew that because there had been no blood, there hadn’t been a story.

In fact, I had a heck of a time getting Business Week to publish the cover story on bogus aircraft parts. Many of my risk-averse, career-conscious colleagues were simply scared to run an article on a potential problem, no matter how real. Nobody wanted to be branded an unthinking alarmist. Maybe this time, we’ll learn.

♦ Metro Nashville’s primary water supply, the 51-millon-gallon Eighth Avenue Reservoir, is less vulnerable to contamination by chemical or biological weapons than is widely believed.

Sure, a terrorist could obtain a deadly virus, cut a hole in the protective fabric cover, and toss the virus into the reservoir. A reporter was able to access the reservoir grounds, drive around the structure, and even stand at the base of the reservoir Monday morning. But the water system’s own cleansing apparatus eventually would eradicate much of the deadly virus. “A terrorist could do some damage, particularly to those who first received the contaminated water flow,” says Edward Thackston, a specialist in water quality management at Vanderbilt. “But a lot more damage could be done using airborne agents since we don’t clean the air before we breathe it.” As well, local gas pipelines around the country are vulnerable to attack, terrorism experts warn.

♦ If you’re in the market for germs, just place an order.

White supremacist Larry Wayne Harris recently had some official-looking letterhead made, and then ordered three vials of bubonic plague from a Rockville, Md., laboratory. The vials were delivered by Federal Express. Law enforcement officials quickly caught him, but since it’s not illegal to possess bubonic plague, he was convicted only of mail fraud. His sentence? Eighteen months’ probation.

If you don’t want to order the stuff already made, you can get various recipes from easily obtainable sources. When the white supremacist group known as the “Patriot’s Council” wanted to get the formula for recin, another deadly biological agent, it reportedly found what it needed in a Soldier of Fortune magazine advertisement. A Soldier of Fortune spokesman, however, does not recall the incident and says the magazine tries to screen such ads before publication.

♦ If you’re wondering why the threat of terrorism hasn’t taken a front seat in this country, consider these statistics.

Tuesday’s terrorists killed an estimated 5,000 people. Last year, drunk drivers killed 16,058 people on America’s roads, heart disease killed an estimated 800,000 Americans, more than 235,000 died last year of cancers of the digestive system, and breast cancer claimed 193,000. Nobody is talking about putting U.S. marshals outside liquor stores and cigarette vending machines.

As the nation mourns, there is a natural tendency to want to figure out precisely what happened. Unfortunately, this often leads to fighting yesterday’s war. Vanderbilt University political science professor Jim Ray, a specialist in international conflict, rightly points out that, as a nation, we’d be well served to focus on “less obvious” sources of potential trouble.

When I was at Business Week in the mid-1990s, I holed up for some weeks in a ramshackle, cockroach-infested hotel near the Miami airport, gathering tidbits for an investigative story on growing numbers of counterfeit aircraft parts showing up on major U.S.-based airlines. While reporting the story, my days were spent with government snitches, undercover cops, aircraft mechanics, airplane parts brokers, and FBI agents who included the uncouth G-man who wasn’t enamored of Adam Bryant (who is, by the way, a first-rate reporter now working at Newsweek).

These aviation safety professionals shared a common mission: They were petrified that the enormous—and lucrative—trade in bogus aircraft parts was going to cause an airline disaster. They were frustrated that few people of note, in the media or elsewhere, would listen to their concerns because the disaster hadn’t happened yet. They knew that because there had been no blood, there hadn’t been a story.

In fact, I had a heck of a time getting Business Week to publish the cover story on bogus aircraft parts. Many of my risk-averse, career-conscious colleagues were simply scared to run an article on a potential problem, no matter how real. Nobody wanted to be branded an unthinking alarmist. Maybe this time, we’ll learn.